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The principal aim of this paper is to point out a striking similarity between
Discourse Representation Structures [7],[8],[9] and so called contexts in a class of
formalisms known as Constructive Type Theories [2],[3]. These formalisms are
based on the propoaitions aa typea concept which goes back to Curry [4]. The
universally desirable features of CTTl include:
. CTT has a small, elegant and very powerful set of deduction rules.
~ CTT is a higher order~ formalism, i.e. we can quantify over arbritrary
predicates and functions within CTT. As a result anaphoric references to
such entities are also possible.
~ Every proof in CTT is a a-expression, that can be directly investigated and
manipulated or reduced. For instance, ~3-reduction on these a-expressions
corresponds directly to cut elimination.
. Moreover, CTT is currently one of the mainstream research areas in the-
oretical computer science. Therefore there ezists an impressive amount of
metalogical knowledge about the formalism.
It will be argued that a DRS is in fact a first order approximation of a CTT context.
Thus, it seems possible to combine the empirical advantages of DRT with the
mathematical rigour as well as the deductive and descriptive power of CTT.
After an informal introduction to CTT in general, which aims at getting
across the basic intuitions relevant to such formalisms, we will select a particular
system and present its formal definition along conventional lines. Unfortunately,
the resulting system is hard to grasp, partly due to inherent difficulties, but
largely for syntactic reasons, and because the presentation does not lend itself
easily to a comparasion with familiar systems like, say, clsssical first order logic
lA related system better known in linguiatics is that of Martin Lóf. (cf. [12], [13])
~. .. in fact, it containe any n'th order logic.
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(CFOL). By a change in representation based on [1], [5] we succeed in isolating, so
to speak, the first order part of the theory, and end up with a natural deduction-
like system that is both easier to understand and uae.
In the second part we present a mapping to translate any Discourse Repre-
sentation Structure into a(first order and uniformally typed) fragment of a CTT
context. The modeltheoretic truth conditions of DRT translate in a natural way
into satisfiability conditions on CTT-fragments ( corresponding to DRSes) with
respect to a given context. Classical semantics is obtained by checking satisfi-
ability with respect to the complete context representing the knowledge of the
omniscient infallible being f2. But since, as a rule, CTT contexts represent only
partial knowledge of a world, CTT enables us to make sense of situations which
crucially involve partial and possibly incorrect knowledge, such as communica-
tion, as well. The formalism also provides us with handles to cope with belief
revision and truth maintenance. This, we believe, is a highly desirable feature
for any realistic linguistic semantic theory.
1 CTT
1.1 GeneralIdeas
Type theories specify a relation between objects and types, often denoted by the
infix operator `:'. This relation depends on a context, which contains all the relevant
information about primitive and prefabricated objects. The objects and types aze
denoted by expressions, and the `:' relation is specified recursively by a collection of
inference rules. More precisely, one infers formulae of the form C~ [E : T] , where C
is a context, E is an expression denoting an object and T is an expression denoting
its type. It is a typical feature of CTT that an expression can, on one hand, occur
as a type, but on the other hand, also act as an object and have a type. One refers
to such expressions as domains. Their types aze called classes. The contexts in CTT
are not sets, but they are sequences of introductions. An introduction postulates the
existence of a primitive object within a domain, and furnishes it with a(new) name.
Context construction starts with an initial context (which only contains the classes)
that can be extended recursively. To postulate the existence of an object that is an
inhabitant of a type T, the context is extended by a pair [n : T], provided n is a new
name, and provided the type T can indeed be shown to be a domain in the context
C. In most systems this is accomplished by showing that that T is the inhabitant of
a class, i.e., that C~ [T : K] , where K is a class. Classes are predefined in the initial
context. The formalism, then, allows you to form contexts, and, given a context, to
infer which expressions aze welformed, and what their types are. In principle, that's
what type theory is all about. Nevertheless, Constructive Type Theory is expressive
enough to formalize and check complicated mathematical texts within it (cf. [6]).
This is primarily due to the central concepts of propositions as types and dependent
function types described below.
Propositions as Types: At first sight there may seem to be an unbridgeable gap
between a type system and a logical system. Type systems seem to be concerned
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with objects and classifications on objects, whereas the essential notion within a
logical system is primarily that of a proof, together with that of a proposition. To
bridge the gap, one could consider a proof as a mathematical object like any other,
such as a number or a function. Consequently, a type system would concern itself
with classifications of proofs, too. It turns out that proofs can be classified according
to the propositions that they prove, i.e., a proposition can be regazded as a domain,
contain.ing all its proofs. Thus, within the system there exist domain-expressions that
represent propositions. Proving a proposition, then, is finding an inhabitant of that
proposition, i.e., constructing an object that has the desired proposition as a type.
Thus proof-checking (even for higher order logic) is reduced to type-checking in a
hierarchical type system, which is a completely mechanical task.
Dependent Function Types: If A and B are domains, we can form the abstrac-
tion expression II[x : A]B, which also denotes a domain, the dependent product of
B indexed over A. The intuition behind a dependent product is that it is a general-
isation of the conventional function type A-. B. Indeed, we will find it convenient
to write A--f B instead of II[x : A]B if x does not occur in B. As an example of a
case where x does occur in B, consider the function f that, given a natural number
x, has as an image the null vector in Rx, i.e, f : II[x : N]Rx. The domain of this
function depends on the argument x , and the type of f cannot be represented in the
conventional arrow notation. In our context, however, the principal use of dependent
function types is in modelling propositions. For instance, once a predicate p on the
type `man' has been defined by an introduction like:
[p : man -. PrvP]
one can construct types like
II[x : man](p x),
which, as we will see, can stand for the proposition that all men have property p.
Practical Use. As mentioned before, in practice the system has been used to for-
malize theories in such a way, that proofs within these texts can be checked mechani-
cally. To translate a particulaz theory, first its basic entities are introduced, followed
by the primary functions and predicates that play a role in the theory. Finally, ato~nic
proof objects are added, which are inhabitants of the axioms relevant in the theory.
These axioms are vital because only they provide some content to the predicates and
functions that were introduced. All these introductions taken together form a con-
text C that represents the baze theory. To prove that a certain theorem holds in this
theory, it is formulated as a proposition P within the system. If an object Q can be
constructed such that C I- [Q : P], P has been shown to be a theorem. It will be
evident that the object Q can be useful later when more elaborate proofs are to be
constructed, that use P as a lemma.
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1.2 Formalisation
We will now give a formal description of a pazticular CTT, the system proposed by
Coquand.
An expression is one of the following:
~ a class: this is an element of {kind,prop, type}.
~ a name: any alphanumerical string that does not denote a class.
~ a a-abstraction: a[x : T]D, T and D aze expressions and x is a variable. The
intuition, is, of course, that the expression denotes a function with formal argu-
ment x of type T, with a body D. We have the usual notion of free and bound
occurrences in expressions.
~ a II-abstraction: II[x : T]D, which denotes a dependent function type. Free and
bound occurences are defined in complete analogy to the case for ~. If x does
not occur free in D we will take the liberty of writing T-~ D.
~ an application expression: (ab), where a and b are expressions. The intuition
is that the expression a denotes a function that is applied to the argument
represented by the expression 6. As usual, function application associates to
the left, so we have ((ab)c) -(abc).
A fragment can be one of the following:
~ a pair: [E : T] where E is an expression and T is an expression. The intuition
is that E is to be an object of type T.
~ a concatenation of fragments: Fl ~ F2, where F1 and F2 aze fragments. The
operator ~ is an associative non commutative concatenation operator. Accord-
ingly, we leave out unnecessary pazenthesis.
This completes the definition of the syntactical structure of the formalism.
On these structures the following functions and predicates aze defined:
~ substitutions aze introduced as functions from expressions to expressions, and
as functions from fragments to fragments: [E~x]E2 denotes the substitution of
the expression E for all free occurences of x in the expression E2. If [S] and
[S1] are substitutions, then [S1 o S] denotes the consecutive substitution that
performs [S1] after [S], accordingly, for any expression E we have [S1]([S]E) -
[S1 o S]E. This notation for substitutions is extended over fragments as follows:
[S][X : T] - [[S]X : [S]T] and [S](Fl ~ F2) - [S]Fl ~ [S]F2.
~ The predicate class(E~ on expressions E is defined as follows:
class(E) iff E e{kind, prop, type}
Classes act as the types of domains.
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~ The binazy predicate ~p on expressions A and B is defined as follows:
A~p B, iff A can be reduced to B using A-reduction steps.
~3-reduction corresponds to the usual notion on a-expressions, (though we de-
mand that the type of the argument in any reduction pair is equal to the domain
of the function).
~ The binazy predicate A-~ B on expressions A and B is defined as follows:
A-p B iff ~C(A ~p C n B~p C).
~ The following predicates are defined which aze central to the formalism:
context(F) for a fragment F (written {F}), and valid~equent(Fl, F2) for frag-
ments Fl and FZ (written Fl ~ FZ). We define these predicates via inference
rules which utilize the shorthand dom(C, D, K) - {C} n C F- [D : K] ~ class(K).
The intuition behind the dom predicate is that the expression D is a domain in
a context C that is an inhabitant of the class K. The inference rules read as
follows:
{ [type : kind] ~ [prop : kínd] }
(init)
The initial fragment, that introduces the classes, is a context. In this version of
CTT, both prop and type are inhabitants of the class kind.
dom(C, D, K) I~ x does not occur free in C
{C~[x:D]}
(intro)
If it can be shown that the type of an expression D within a context C is a
class, then D is a domain expression, and one may extend C with postulated









All fragments derivable in a common context can be concatenated.
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C ~ [x : T] ~ [B : D]
C~- [a[x:T]B:II[x:T]D]
(.1-abstraction)
To find the type of a function, it suffices to find the type of the body in a context
extended with a formal argument.
C~ [E:A]nC~ [q:II[x:A]D]
C ~- [(QE) : [E~x]D]
(application)
The type of an application expression is the range-type of the function, if the
azgument can be shown to `fit' the function. If the function type is dependent
however, one must make the appropriate substitutions. This rule is related to
the modus ponens rule in CFOL.
dom(C ~ [x : A], D, K)
(II-abstraction)
C~[II[x:A]D:K]




The type of a given expression may be exchanged for any other that is Q-equal,
provided that the replacing type can be shown to be a domain.
1.2.1 Some Properties
The rules for F- given above can be used recursively to determine the type of an object
in a given context. This is straightforwazd because the structure of the object at hand
always determines which rule to apply. The only rule that could be problematic in
this respect, is the type conversion rule. It can be proven however, that the system
described above has the Church~Rosser property under A-reduction, and that it is
strongly normalising, as well. This implies that every reduction on an object or a
domain always terminates and yields a unique normal form, thereby guazanteeing the
decidability of the equality of domains. Consequently, the predicates {} and ~- are
decidable (. .. and proof checking can be mechanized).
It has been proven that the system is substitutive, a property we will employ in later
sections:
Cl ~[x : A] ~ C, F- [O : Tj n Cl ~[E : A]
Ci ~ [E~x]C~ ~ [E~x][D : T]
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(substitution)
Furthermore, the system is closed under (object-)reduction:
I C F- [E : T] n C~[El : D] n El 1p E
(object closure)
~ T~pD
This last property means, among other things, that a proof for a proposition T,
which can be reduced, will still prove essentially the same after reduction. It turns
out that ,Q-reduction on proofs correponds to cut elimination.
1.3 Texts and Contexts
A slight change in representation allows us to formulate a system that is intuitively
more appealing. First we introduce the following notions:
~ A fragment F is a valid extension to a context C, iff {C ~ F}. Note, that if
[xl : Dl] ...[xn : D„] is a valid extension to C, it follows that none of the x; do
occur free in C.
. For any valid extension we define the notion of an assignment as follows: An
assignment for a pair P- [x : T] in C is a substitution [E~x], where E is an
expression. An assignment [A] for a valid extension (Fl ~ FZ) in C is [AZ o A1]
where [Al] is an assignment on Fl in C and [AZ] is an assignment on [Al]FZ in
C.
~ Let V be a valid extension on a context C. Let [A] be an assignment for V in
C. V is satisfiable on C through the assignment (A] iff C ~- [A]V (Notation:
C[A}- V).
As a consequence of substitutivity it follows directly that
~ C1~V~G n Cl[S'rV
Cl ~ [5]G
(satisfaction)
These notions and properties play a role in the more general representation of frag-
ments in terms of texts, that we will develop below. Fragments aze generalized to
texts by the introduction of the connector `~'. The underlying idea is that we
have:
C~V~GiffC~Vf-G.
Syntactically, a text is one of the following:
~ a pair P
~ an arrow V~ G where V is a text and G is a text.
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~ a concatenation Gl ~ GZ, where Gl and GZ are texts.
We define a relation ~ (is congruent to) between fragments and texts:
[E : T] ~ [E : T]
(ident)
Fi~Gi n Fs -Gs
F1~F,~G1~G,
(conc)
[(Qx):T] ~G ~ [x:A] -V
[Q : II[x : A]T] ~ (V ~ G)
[T:K]~Gn [x:A]~V
[II[x : A]T : K] ~ (V ~ G)
F~(U~(V~G))







Given this congruency, we can write a text G instead of a fragment F. This means that
for a given fragment there exist many notational variants, which are all equivalent,
at least, if one can show that Fi ~ G n FZ ~ G implies Fl - F2. This is indeed the
case, because the congruency is inversely related to a rewrite system that is strongly
normalising. The proof rests on the absence of non conflatable critical pairs in the
rewrite system. All predicates defined on fragments can now be extended to predicates
over texts in a direct way. Deduction using texts is more intuitive. For instance, the

















That these rules hold follows from proof theoretical azguments, which show that for
any derived rule there would exist a derivation tree in the original system (modulo
the congruence ~). With them we have defined a formal system in natural deduction
style, based on constructive type theory.
Before we proceed to the next section, where we will translate Discourse Representa-
tion Structures into texts, it is important to note some properties of azrows:
. In any arrow V~ G, the text V contains introductions of vaziables that
originate from introductions of bound vaziables in II expressions. Because bound
variables aze subject to a-conversion, one can rename these vaziables freely
troughout the arrow. We call these variables the `slots' of the azrow. Intuitively
all these slots are vaziables that aze `introduced' in V.
. Let C be a context, and C~ V ~ G Let U be any valid extension to C. Now
one can always rename the `slots' of V in such a way that V is a valid extension
to C~ U (or to C itself).
. Let [S] be a satisfying assignment for a text V~ G on a context C. Let
U be an arbritrazy extension of C. Let [Sl] be any satifying assignment for
V on C~ U. Then it holds that C~ U~[S][Sl]G. (This is a consequence
of modus ponens, [S] can be exchanged with [S1] because the substitutions
do not intersect.) Thus, a satisfying assignment for V~ G on a context C
insures that on any extension of C there exists a satisfying assignment for G if
a satisfying assignment for V exists.
2 Discourse Representation
2.1 DRT
Within Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) a discourse is represented by a DRS
(a Discourse Representation Structure). A DRS consists of two pazts:
. a sequence of (discourse-)referents
. a sequence of entries
We will represent a sequence of referents by a list (Tl .. .Tn). The empty list is written
as ().
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A DRS will be written as (rl ... rn) ~ Ei ~ Ez ... En, where El ... En aze entries.
An entry is either:
. an atomic condition, i.e., an n-ary predicate applied to a number of referents.
. a complex condition, written as Dl ~ DZ.
. a link [R - N], where R is a referent. and N is a name in the model.
A DRS is interpreted in relation to a mo.del W. This model contains entities and
predicates over these entities. The entities have names, and the predicates have
predicate symbols. To keep things simple we will allow a DRS to refer directly to
these entities and predicates, through the use of the names and the predicate symbols.
An assignment on a DRS (rl ...T„) ~ El ... E„i is a conventional substitution, that
substitutes a name in the model for each referent, that is, it assigns an entity in the
model to each referent rl ... r,,. A DRS D is verifiable in relation to a model W if
there exists an assignment [A] from all the referents rl ... rn of D to the entities in W
such that all the resulting entries in D aze true. We call this assignment a verifying
assignment of D in W.
Let [A] be an assignment on D. An entry E' , where E' is [A]E in the DRS D is true
if one of the following holds:
. E' is an atomic condition and the proposition E' holds in W.
. E' is a link [N' - N] and it is true in W that N' - N.
. E' is a complex condition D1 ~ DZ and for any assignment [S1] that verifies
Dl the DRS [S1]DZ is verifiable in W.
A proof that this last condition is fullfilled must produce a verifying assignment [S]
for any [Sl] that verifies Dl, i.e., an[S] such that all the entries in [S][Sl]DZ are true.
2.2 Translation of DRS to Text
The similazities between a DRS and a text are immediately transparent. To translate
a DRS into a text, a relation trans between a DRS and a text is defined by the
following rules:3
trans(R, A, U) I` trans(D, A, V)
(t-drs)
trans(R ~ D, A, U~ V)
trans(Dl, A, Vi) n trans(Dzi A, V~)
(t-concat)
trans(Dl ~ Vl, A, Dz ~ Vz)
~ Where append(A, B, C) meana that C ia the result of concatenating A and B.
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ref list((rl . . . rn))
trans((rl . . . rn), (), [rl : entity] ~ . . . [rn : entity])
re flist((rl . . . r„))
trans((rl...rn), (al...an), [(rl al...an) : entity] ~...[(rn al...an) : entity])
trans(Dl, () , V) I` trans(Dz, A„ G) n Dl - A1 ~ C n append(Ao, A1, A, )
trans(Dl ~ Dzi Ao, V~ G)
proposátion(P)
trans(P, (), [p : P])
proposition(P)
trans(P, (al ...an), [(Pal...an) : P])
link([R - N])
trans([R - N], (), [p : (eq R N)])
link([R - N])





Given this definition (which can almost be read as a PROLOG program), any
proof of trans(D, (),V), produces a text V that is a translation of the DRS D.4
Our mapping translates all referents to vaziables of type `entity'. The reason for
this lies, of course, in the somewhat impoverished (i.e., non-existent) typesystem of
DRT, and is by no means required by the CTT formalism. Nor is the use of atomic
types. In CTT, types like ~human male~, (human female~, animal or object could be
used in order to impose some taxonomy on the objects in the domain of discourse.
2.3 Semantics
We will investigate the question as to how far the presented translation preserves
the underlying semantics. Let D be a DRS and W a model, and assume that D is
verifiable on W. Now this means, that for all referents (rl ... r„) of D there exist
substitutions, such that all the entries aze true on W. Let V be a text such that
trans(D,(),V). By analogy, a text V is verifiable on a context C if there exists an
assignment [A] for V on C with C[A]- V. But how can a context C be found, that
can serve as a basis for the judgement of the text V? This is not as tricky as it seems,
~Note, that, strictly apeaking, we can only translate a DRS that is not empty. Of course, one can
introduce the notion of an empty fragment `~' that serves ae the identity element of the concatenation





because one can also pose a similaz question for DRT. How can one find a suitable
model W in relation to which D should be judged? Even if one believes that any
discourse should relate to the actual world, there is no sensible way of constructing a
model for it: No one has complete knowledge of the world, and there is no hope of
ever knowing it. The answer is, then, that any model W will be constructed by an
agent, and therefore it will reflect the knowledge, or more precisely, the beliefs of its
constructor. If, as in the case of DRT, verification is based on a complete model, the
poor constructor is also obliged to add fiction for those parts of the world he does
not know. (This resembles the way in which the artists filled the blank spaces in
medieval maps.) In CTT the situation is rather different. Contexts do not pretend to
be a model of the world, they aze inherently paztial and therefore suited perfectly to
represent some agent's beliefs about the world. Thus, to interpret utterances within
the framework of CTT, the corresponding (CTT-)text will be judged using a context
C~ of an agent J. Accordingly, the resulting judgement will not be universal nor
absolute, but it will precisely reflect the judgement of that pazticulaz agent.
2.3.1 Simulating `classical' semantics
In order to reproduce a`classical' semantics, like that of DRT, one has to assume the
existence of an`omniscient' agent S2, whose knowledge state C~, implicitly contains
all the knowledge of the `real' world W.
The agent SZ needs to have proofs for all first order statements that hold in W,
and disproofs for all the statements that do not hold. The context C~, must contain
introductions for all entities in W, and closure axioms that exclude the existence of
other entities. Equality could be handled as an ordinazy predicate. Finally axioms
must be provided that allow construction of all `first order' functions within the
context C~,.
To show that this leads to equivalent semantic notions we need to prove that:
3[A](C~,[AWrV) I~ trans(D,(),V)
(back)
~ ~[A'](verif(W, [A'], D))
and
I 3[A'](verif (W, [A'], D)) n trans(D, (), V)
(forth)
~ ~[A~,](C~,[AW]- V)
where the predicate veri f(W, [A~, D) means that [A'] is a verifying assignment for
D in the model W. For our present purposes a short sketch of the necessazy elements
of such a proof will sutfice.
One should note right away that the assignment [A~,] is in many ways more ex-
plicit than its counterpazt [A']: [A~,] does not only assign objects to entities, but also
contains formal proofs that the substituted entities satisfy their requirements, i.e.,
that [A'] is, indeed, a verifying assignment.
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So it comes as no surprise, that it is easy to construct [A'] if [A~,] is given: [A~,]
assigns to its variables either entities, or proof objects, or functions that yield enti-
ties, or functions that yield proof objects. By simply leaving out all the proof objects
and the functions in [A~,] we regain the assignment [A']. The proof objects in [A~,]
show that the assignment [A'] satisfies the properties it must satisfy. The functions
can be used to demonstrate that satisfying assignments exist for the consequents of
conditions, given arbritrary satisfying assignments for the antecedents of the condi-
tions.
But to establish equivalence we must also show that we can construct [A~,] if [A'] is
given. This, of course, is more difficult, as the assignment [A'] in itself does not suffice
to show that it satisfies D in W. To derive [A~,] anyway, we have to take into account
not only [A'], but also the truth conditions on [A'] (cf. p. 10), that is, we have to make
explicit, and, so to say, hazd-code into [A~,] the relevant properties of the metalangage
of [A']. One of these properties is the requirement that the substitution (A'] must be
such that all resulting entries in D are true in W. As faz as propositions and links
are concerned, this property of [A'] ensures that the required proof objects that we
need to extend [A'] with in order to construct [A~,] aze indeed constructable within
C~,. The situation is more complicated in the case of complex conditions D1 ~ D2.
Here the existence of satisfying substitutions for the referents of D2 is required for
any satisfying assignment to the referents of D1. Now this boils down to the existence
of functions on the model W that produce a satisfying assignment for any referent
in D2 given a satisfying assignment for D1. Remember that we imposed on C~, the
requirement that all first order functions that exist on W can be constructed in C~,.
So proofs for the properties of these functions can be constructed, too, and [A'] can
be extended with the required substitutions.
2.3.2 The constructive approach
After this short digression into the realms of mythology let us return to the real life
issues: In real life, there is no principal reason why the knowledge of some agent
should be complete, or even accurate. On the contrazy, all utterances are judged by
agents that have only partial, and often even incorrect knowledge of a state of affairs.
It is of crucial importance that such situations can be represented and understood
formally. Thus the communicative reflections of a common mortal seem to be a lot
more interesting to investigate than the godlike verdicts of S2. Therefore we will
now introduce a common mortal agent J, and study its judgements in a number of
examples. These examples suggest that interesting situations, which occur in real life,
but cannot easily be handled in a classical approach, receive a quite natural treatment
in CTT. Among these aze cases where an agent is provided with `new' information,
and utterances involving scope ambiguity.
We assume that the world knowledge of the agent J is described by a context
Cj. It contains the basic mathematical and logical knowledge that the agent uses, it
contains all entities in the world, whose existence it assumes, as well as introductions
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and axiomatisations of all the predicates and functions on these entities that the
person conceives of. As an example, take the following contextb:
[type : kànd]
[prop : kind]
The context of any agent must be an extension of the initial context.
[entity : type]
This agent only introduces one type, for the sake of simplicity. Note, that, as a
consequence, it has immediately created all the associated Curry types.
[x : entity][y : entity] ~[(eq x y) : prop]
The agent knows that equality is a relation within the type.
[p : entity --r prop] ~ [x : entity] ~ [y : entity] ~ [g : (p x)] ~ [z : (eq x y)]
~ [(leibnizpxyzg) : (py)]
It gives meaning to equality using leibnitz rule.
[x : entity] ~[(refI x) :(eq x x)]
and by postulating reflexivity of equality.
[contradiction : prop]
The agent conceives of something called a contradiction.
[x : contradiction][p : prop] ~ [(x p) : p]
It also knows that a proof of the contradiction would allow you to prove any-
thing. The contradiction is very important because ít enables the agent to
formalize negative knowledge. For instance, to formalize that certain entities
are not equal, it can define a transitive relation that is not reflexive.
Of course, the agent also has knowledge (beliefs) about the state of affairs in
the world:
[x : entity] ~ [(farmerx) : prop]
[x : entity] ~ [(donkey x) : prop]
[x : entity] ~ [y : entity] ~ [(hits x y) : prop]




[f2 : (donkey jerry)]
[f3 : (owns pedro jerry)]
óFor lay-out reasons we have replaced the outer occurencea of the operator `~' within this context
by vertical spacing
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[x : entity] ~ [y : entity] ~ [pl : (f armer x)] ~ [p2 : ( donkey y)][p3 : (owns x y)]
~[(rlx y pl p2 p3) :(hits x y)]
Every farmer who owns a donkey, hits it.
[x : entity] ~ [pl : (owns x pedro)] ~ [(r2 x pl) : contradiction]
No one owns pedro.
f~c.
Given this context, suppose our agent is confronted with the following utterances:
~ A farmer owns a donkey. He hits it.
It will be evident, that under a translation process analogous to that of DRT, the
following text V will result:g
[f : entity] ~ [p : ( f armer f ) ] ~ [d : entity]~ [p2 : (donkey d)]
~ [pl : (owns f d)] ~ [p3 : (hits f d)]
The agent should judge this text. V is a valid extension to C~ , i.e., we have {C~ ~V }.
It is also a satisfiable extension, which means that the utterance is judged to be true.
The satisfying assignment [A~] with Cj[A~r V reads as follows:
A~ -[(rl pedro jerry f1 f 2 f 3)~p3 o f3~p1 o f 2~p2 o jerry~d o f l~p o pedro~f]
~ jerry hits pedro.
This utterance is translated into:
[z : (hita jerrypedro)].
Again, it is a valid extension of the context C~. But, in this case, no satisfying
assignment exists, the sentence does not follow from the context C~. But falsehood
cannot be proven either, and nothing prevents our agent J to extend its context
C~ with this new and exciting information, if it chooses to consider it valid. The
advantages of the constructive, `partial' approach to cases like this is obvious.
~ every farmer owns jerry.
This is translated into the text V2:
[x : entity] ~ [p : (farmer x)] ~ [(q x p) : (owns x jerry)]
6A direct tranelation algorithm into CTT which preserves ther DRT restrictions on anaphora
resolution, but allows for an elegant treatment of a much wider range of linguistic phenomena than
the original DRT fragment in [7], will be given in [10].
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Again a valid extension, but even if there are no entities within C~ that are fazmers
except pedro, the utterance is still contentious. No satisfying assignment for V2 can
be found. This is a consequence of the fact that the agent is neither omniscient, nor
does it believe that it knows all farmers that exist. Consequently, it does not have
a way to verify the statement. If, however, the agent does believe that it knows all
the farmers, this conviction should be expressed within the context, for instance by a
clause like
[p : entity -. prop] ~ [z : (p pedro)] ~ [f : entity] ~ [q2 : (farmer f )]
~[(farmercloaurep x f q2) :(p f)]
If we incorporate this axiom7 into C~ we can indeed reach the relevant conclusion,
using
[A~] -[( farrnerclosure J1[e : entity](owna e jerry) f3)~q]
[x : entity] ~ [p : (farmer x)]
~[((farmercloaure ~[e : entity](owna e jerry) f3) x p) :(owns x jerry)]
~ every farmer owna something.
with the translation V3
[x : entity] ~ [p : (farmer x)] ~ [(d x p) : entity] ~ [(q x p) : (owns x (d x p))]
This example, though qua `truth conditions' compazable to the previous one, has an
interesting additional hitch: it involves scope ambiguities. Again, our agent does not
assume fazmer-closure. Thus, there is no satisfying assignment for V3. If the agent
chooses to believe the statement, it will extend its context with V3. But, when doing
so, no decision has to be made about the scopes of the quantifiers. Even the introduc-
tion of new fazmers doesn't cause any trouble. If, by some coincidence, it turns out
that all farmers own the same thing, all that happens is that information about the
function d is added to the context, like, e.g. .1[xl : entity]~[pl :(farmerxl)] jerry,
showing that this function is, in fact, a constant.
Finally, let us look at an example which gives rise to quite a different situation:
. jerry owns pedro.
translated into:
[z : (owna jerrypedro)].
This translation, too, is a valid extension of C~. But now there is not only no satisfying
assignment, but the extension even leads to an inconsistent knowledge state, i.e.,
within the extended context, the contradiction is provable:
C~ ~ [z : (owna jerrypedro)] ~ [(r2 jerryz) : contradiction]
~Note that this axiom is much stronger than the ( possible) accomodation of C~ by adding V~.
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So, in the context C„ the statement is judged to be false and will be rejected.
It is worth noting, however, that rejection is not the only possible way to resolve
this dilemma. If our agent has reason to believe the speaker, it might want to up-
date its context in a non-monotonic way in order to add z without ending up with
inconsistent knowledge. Although the formalism presented here does not cover non-
monotonic belief maintenance, the presence of explicit proof objects in CTT provides
us-in cleaz contrast to model theoretic approaches-with a fairly straightforward
handle on such problems: It allows us to identify the `villain' causing the inconsis-
tency easily. In the case at hand, the problematic proof is (r2 jerryz). To accept z,
our agent has to reject either r2 or jerry. If jerry is rejected, anything that contains
jerry has to be removed, too-including z, since the existence of jerry is a presup-
position of the assertion (owns jerrypedro). So this choice is ruled out. Therefore,
if agent J insists on z, it is forced to reject r2. In cases where the resulting context
still contains contradictions, this procedure can be repeated. We reserve the details
of this way of updating beliefs for a subsequent paper.
3 Conclusions
We have shown that any DRS can be translated into a fragment in CTT. Judgements
on such fragments can be made with respect to CTT contexts. The deductive system
that lies at the roots of these judgements is very powerful, and the language is very
expressive. As these contexts may represent the paztial knowledge state of an agent,
we can model how one agent judges the utterance of another, independent of any
notion of a complete or absolute truth. This could be considered a first step towards
a theory of communication.
3.1 Future directions
It seems reasonable to assume that a theory of discourse processing could profit from
the expressivity of CTT in many ways. Apart from the fact that CTT is able to handle
higher order expressions, as in the induction example, the types that CTT offers can be
used to structure the domain of discourse in a formally sound way. Moreover, there are
several natural extensions of CTT (e.g., definitions 8s dependent sums) which facilitate
the task of constructing linguistically reasonable (`quasi-compositional') translations
from natural language to CTT. We will expand on some of these issues in [10]. Finally,
we would like to note that it is possible:
. To translate a limited kernel of natural language into the formalism.
. To have an sutomatic deduction facility for the formalism in question [5].
. To generate natural language from fragments in the formal language [11].
Thus, one might be inclined to think that a primitive reasoning agent, able to interact
within a limited natural language fragment, can be constructed along these lines.
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